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[S]ome things never change: The tech industry continues to whip up excitement by 
promising amazing new technologies, only to crush our spirits by delaying, postponing, 
pushing back or otherwise derailing the arrival of said goods -- sometimes indefinitely.1  
 
I.  Introduction 
It is a widely adopted practice for firms to announce new products well in 
advance of actual market availability, especially in the computer industry.  This practice 
of pre-announcement often has been derisively referred to as “vaporware” since many of 
the products either never reach the market or are significantly delayed.2  As such, the 
practice has been subject to scrutiny by policymakers for its potential predatory and anti-
competitive implications.  Specific examples include the IBM case in 1960s and, more 
recently, the Microsoft case.  In the IBM case, for example, IBM announced the 
development of its System/360 line of computers and related peripherals far in advance 
of their availability, and the Department of Justice accused IBM of making premature and 
predatory product announcements regarding the product line.3  
In relation to the landmark antitrust case of U.S. vs. IBM,  Fisher, et al. (1983) 
provide an early discussion of information transmission, product pre-announcement, and 
reputation. In defense of such a practice, Fisher, et al. argue: 
 
In general, there is no reason to inhibit the time when a firm announces or brings 
products to the marketplace.  Customers will be the final arbiters of the product’s 
quality and the firm’s reputation.  Broken promises and unattractive products can 
be expected to lead quickly to a loss of credibility and sales. . . . Advance 
announcement of truthful information about products cannot be anticompetitive.  
Indeed, such announcement is procompetitive; competition thrives when 
information is good. . . . If those announcements of its belief were made in good 
faith, then it was imparting information to consumers and competitors as to what 
it expected to do.  Even if it was later unable to do those things, the imparting of 
such information can only aid competition.   Only deliberate falsehood could 
possibly be anticompetitive here, and that is highly improbable since a firm that 
practiced such tactic would acquire a tarnished reputation that would ill-serve it in 
the future (pp. 289-290).  
 
                                                 
1 Quoted from “Vaporeware 2000: Missing Inaction,” Wired News by Leander Kahney. 
2 See Bayus et al. (2001) for an entertaining discussion on the origin of the term “vaporware.” 
3 For a detailed discussion of the IBM case, see Fisher et al. (1983).  See also Levy (1997) for antitrust 
implications of vaporware. 
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In this paper, we develop a reputation model of vaporware in which firms can 
make product pre-announcements.  More specifically, we consider a situation where a 
firm develops a new product while a competitive product already exists.  Consumers need 
to decide whether to purchase the currently available product or to wait until the advent 
of the new product. For this decision to be relevant, we assume that, due to switching 
costs, consumers cannot purchase the existing product and later make another purchase 
when the new product is available (see Klemperer (1995)).   However, consumers do not 
have perfect information about the quality/availability of the new product, which is the 
firm’s private information.  We ask whether or not consumers can rely on firm-provided 
information concerning the quality/availability of the new product.  Since the firm always 
prefers to have the consumers wait for its product, the firm’s pre-announcement cannot 
have any informational content if the game is played only once.   Thus, we consider a 
pre-announcement game played twice to investigate under what circumstances the firm 
can convey the information in a credible way.   
In our paper, different types of firms that have different R&D capabilities have 
different chances of introducing a high-quality product in the second product cycle. We 
derive the value of being honest endogenously and show that the value of being honest 
increases in the chance of introducing a high-quality product in the second product cycle. 
That is, firms with higher R&D capabilities care more about their reputation. We find that 
there can be an informative equilibrium where the product pre-announcement can convey 
information about the product’s quality.  The equilibrium is characterized by a cut-off 
point where semi-separation of types takes place; only types higher than the cut-off point 
have the incentive to tell the truth when product quality is low.  Thus, in equilibrium we 
can observe various outcomes—both lying and telling the truth—depending on the firm’s 
type.   
We also analyze the welfare effects of product pre-announcement and discuss its 
anti-trust implications. We show that product pre-announcements always benefit 
consumers. Even if the firm might make misleading claims about its product quality, 
consumers can rationally discount the firm’s claims, and the firm’s announcement can be 
at least partially revealing, which helps consumers make a better decision. 
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Farrell and Saloner (1986) provide an early analysis of how product pre-
announcements affect consumers’ technology adoption decisions.  In response to the 
argument made above by Fisher, et al. (1983), they point out the possibility of anti-
competitive product pre-announcements in the presence of network effects.  In particular, 
they construct a dynamic model of technology adoption in which the timing of the 
announcement of a new incompatible product can critically determine whether the new 
product succeeds in replacing the existing technology.  Due to the presence of network 
effects, even if the potential users who decide to wait are indeed well-informed and their 
welfare is increased as a result of product pre-announcement, their adoption of the new 
technology may adversely affect both the users in the installed base and later adopters 
who might have preferred the old technology to the new one.  Their paper, however, 
considers only truthful pre-announcements and the possibility of false announcements 
and consumers’ potentially incorrect inference about the informational content is not 
analyzed. 
Several papers also analyze how product pre-announcements can be used as a 
strategic tool.   For instance, Bayus, et al. (2001) present a model in which product pre-
announcement is used as a strategic signal for rival firms. In the paper, intentional 
vaporware is used as a way to dissuade competitors from developing their own 
competing new products.  Our model, in contrast, analyzes a communication channel 
between the firm and consumers.  Thus, the purpose of product pre-announcement in 
Bayus, et al. (2001) is entry deterrence, whereas the purpose of our model is to persuade 
consumers to wait until the arrival of its new product. 4 Also, Bayus, et al. adopt an ad 
hoc assumption that making a false announcement is costly, without any micro-
foundation for penalty costs associated with false announcements.  In contrast, we 
develop a model of vaporware in which the reputation cost is endogenously derived.  
Gerlach (2004) is another paper that examines an entrant’s incentives to pre-announce 
new products when such pre-announcements may induce the incumbent to cut prices and 
preempt the market. He shows that the possibility of a preemptive move by the 
                                                 
4 Haan (2003) is another paper that develops a model of vaporware as a means of entry deterrence.   In his 
model, however, separating equilibria do not exist and all firms claim that they have innovation.  As a 
result, pre-announcement has no informational content.  In contrast, in our paper, only a subset of firms lie, 
and, as a result, the pre-announcement is partially informative. 
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incumbent may prevent the entrant from making announcements.  In contrast to our paper, 
he focuses primarily on verifiable announcements.5  We show how reputational concerns 
may prevent firms from making false announcements.      
Levy (1997) explores anti-trust implications of vaporware.   As in our model, he 
considers a situation in which consumers do not know the veracity of the firm’s 
announcement when it is made.  However, he does not explicitly model reputation.  
Dranove and Gandal (2003) provide an empirical analysis of pre-announcement effects in 
the DVD market. In the standard war between the DVD and DIVX formats, they show 
that the pre-announcement of DIVX slowed down the adoption of DVD technology, 
which is consistent with our theory. 
Our paper is also related to the theoretical literature on strategic information 
transmission, which examines how an uninformed party elicits information from an 
informed party when these two sides can have a ‘cheap talk.’ (See Crawford and Sobel 
(1982) and Sobel (1985), for example.)   Sobel (1985) analyzes how reputation is formed 
in a cheap talk under the assumption that an ‘honest’ type always tells the truth. One 
important paper that is closely related to ours is Morris (2001).  As in Sobel (1985) and 
our paper, Morris (2001) analyzes reputational concerns that arise endogenously when a 
static cheap talk game is repeated.  He considers an advice game in which an informed 
advisor wishes to convey a valuable piece of information to an uninformed policymaker 
with identical preferences.  In a twice-repeated cheap talk game, Morris analyzes how 
reputation concerns affect a cheap talk between informed and uninformed sides.   In 
particular, he focuses on the possibility that reputational concerns might lead to a 
situation in which no information is conveyed in equilibrium.  He calls this “political 
correctness.” 6  Both Morris’s and our paper deal with how concerns about future 
reputation can impact the transmission of information today.   One major difference is 
that he considers a situation in which the advisor has incentives to tell the truth in a static 
context, whereas the advisor’s incentives to tell the truth and the possibility of valuable 
information being transmitted are distorted in a dynamic context.  In contrast, we 
                                                 
5 If false announcements were allowed, all firms would lie in equilibrium. 
6 This paradoxical result takes place when the policymaker thinks that the advisor might be biased in favor 
of one decision, and the advisor, wanting his/her valuable advice to have an impact on future decisions, 
does not wish to be thought of as biased. 
 4
consider a situation in which the informed party always has incentives to lie and no 
information can be conveyed in a static context, and we investigate how reputational 
concerns can mitigate this problem.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section II, we develop a 
model of product pre-announcements.   We derive conditions under which a vaporware 
equilibrium exists and discuss its properties.   In equilibrium, more-innovative firms have 
incentives to maintain reputation and make truthful announcements while less-innovative 
firms have incentives to make false announcements.   Overall, the announcements are 
partially revealing in equilibrium.  In section III, we analyze welfare implications of 
product pre-announcements.  Section IV contains concluding remarks. 
 
II.  A Model of Vaporware 
We consider a game that is played by consumers and a firm that develops a 
sequence of new products.  For simplicity, we assume that there are two sequential 
product cycles in which the firm can introduce a new product.  In each product cycle, 
there exists an alternative product that is competitively supplied.  When the firm develops 
a new product in each product cycle, the quality of the new product can be either high (H) 
or low (L).  The probability that the development research outcome leads to a high-
quality product is denoted by θ ∈[0,1], which can be considered the firm’s type.   The 
firm type is invariant across product cycles and represents the firm’s “innovativeness” or 
research capability.  The realization of quality, however, is independent across product 
cycles.  The firm knows its own type, θ, but consumers know only the distribution of θ.  
We assume that θ is distributed according to a distribution function F(.).      
In each product cycle, there are two periods.  In the first period, the only product 
available is the existing product that is competitively supplied.  The firm is in the process 
of developing a new product that can be introduced in the second period.  Through the 
product development process, the firm knows the quality of the product to be introduced 
in the next period.  To analyze the implications of product pre-announcement, we allow 
the firm to communicate the quality of the product to consumers prior to its actual 
introduction to persuade consumers to delay their purchase.  However, we do not allow a 
contract between the firm and consumers that is contingent on the delivered quality of the 
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new product.  In other words, we assume that there is no recourse for consumers if the 
firm does not deliver its promised quality.7    
In each product cycle, consumers have unit demand for the product.  Each 
consumer has two choices in the first period: he can either purchase the existing product 
at the competitive price or wait until the second period for the new product.   We assume 
that once the consumer purchases in the first period, he cannot switch to the new product 
in the second period.   The assumption can be justified if the product is a durable good 
and making another purchase in the second period does not justify the additional price to 
pay or if there is a very high switching cost (Klemperer (1995)).   When consumers wait, 
they forego current consumption benefits that can be interpreted as their waiting costs.  
Consumers are heterogeneous in their current consumption benefits from the existing 
product, which we denote as w.  The foregone consumption benefits/waiting costs (w) are 
distributed on [0, ∞) according to a cumulative distribution function G(.) with continuous 
density G′ ≥ 0.    
The new product developed by the firm is superior to the existing product 
regardless of its quality realizations.    For each quality realization, we assume that how 
much additional value the new product provides vis-à-vis the existing product is random 
and differs across consumers.  This value is revealed to consumers only in the second 
period and is unknown to them in the first period.8   As a result, the additional value of 
the new product for a consumer is independent of his current benefits from the existing 
product, and each consumer makes his purchase/wait decision based on expected values, 
with the high-quality product providing more additional expected value than the low-
quality one.  The consumers are, thus, heterogeneous only in terms of waiting costs in the 
first period.  This assumption simplifies our analysis since it implies that the waiting 
decision in the first period does not provide any information about the consumer’s 
relative valuation of the new product and prevents the firm from practicing behavior-
based dynamic price discrimination (Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) and Taylor (2003)).   
                                                 
7 For instance, when a software company promises features of a new software program in advance, it could 
be difficult to describe them in precise terms, without any ambiguity, so that the contract could be 
enforceable in court. 
8 For instance, when new features are promised for new software, it would be difficult to know in advance 
how much additional value such features would provide. 
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Let sH (sL) be the expected value of the indirect utility difference between the 
high-quality (low-quality) new and old products if consumers delay their purchase 
decision until the introduction of the new product. That is, the expected consumer surplus 
from waiting until period two is w + si, where i = H or L, depending on the quality 
realization of the new product, while that of buying the current product in period one is 
2w.   
We assume that sH > sL>0; a consumer gets a higher surplus from the high-quality 
product than from the low-quality product.  This implies that consumers are more willing 
to wait if the new product is of high quality.   When a consumer waits, the firm’s 
expected profits from the high- and low-quality products in period two are denoted by 
 and , respectively, where  > > 0.   We do not lay out a specific model of 
competition between the firm that introduces the new product and the competitive 
suppliers of the existing product and strive to be as general as possible in the model set-
up.  However, we provide a specific model that fits with the assumptions of the general 
setting in the Appendix. 
Hπ Lπ Hπ Lπ
 
II.1.  No Announcement Case 
To analyze the implications of product pre-announcements, let us consider first 
the case where such announcements are not feasible or are banned by the government as 
a benchmark case.  In such a case, the consumer’s expected value from waiting until the 
second period in the first product cycle is given by 1w  = E(θ) sH+ (1-E(θ))sL, where E(θ) 
= .   Thus, the number of consumers who delay their purchase decisions are given 
by G(
∫10 )(θθdF
1w ).    
In the second product cycle, the consumers can update their beliefs about the firm 
type from the quality of the product in the first cycle.   If the firm produced a high-quality 
product in the first cycle, then the expected value of the firm type is given by: 
E(θ|H) = 1
0
1
( )0
( ) (
dF
dFθθ θ )θ θ∫∫ =  
2( )
( )
E
E
θ
θ   
In contrast, if the firm produced a low-quality product in the first product cycle, the 
updated beliefs are given by: 
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 E(θ|L) = 1
0
1 1
(1 ) ( )0
( )
dF
dFθθ θ ( )θ θ−−∫∫ = [ (1 )]1 ( )E Eθ θθ−−   
 
Lemma 1. E(θ|L) < E(θ) < E(θ|H). 
Proof.  We use Jensen’s inequality to prove the claim. 
E(θ|H) =  
2( )
( )
E
E
θ
θ  ≥
2[ ( )]
( )
E
E
θ
θ = E(θ). 
E(θ|L) = [ (1 )]
1 ( )
E
E
θ θ
θ
−
−  = 
2( ) ( )
1 ( )
E E
E
θ θ
θ
−
−  ≤ 
2( ) [ ( )]
1 ( )
E E
E
θ θ
θ
−
− =
( )[1 ( )]
1 ( )
E E
E
θ θ
θ
−
− = E(θ).  Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 1 says that consumers revise their beliefs about the firm’s research capability 
upward after the introduction of a high-quality product and downward after the 
introduction of a low-quality product.  The consumer’s expected value from waiting until 
the second period in the second product cycle therefore depends on the quality of the new 
product in the previous cycle.  If the previous introduction is of quality q, the consumer’s 
expected value from waiting is 2w ( q) = E(θ| q) sH+ (1-E(θ| q))sL, where q = H, L and 
2w  ( H) > 1w > 2w  ( L).    The number of consumers waiting in the second product cycle 
in turn depends on the history of the game and is given by G( 2w  ( H))  and  G( 2w  ( L)), 
respectively, with G( 2w  ( H)) > G( 1w ) > G( 2w  ( L)).   
 
II.2.  The Announcement Case  
Now we allow the possibility that the firm announces in the first period the 
product quality in each cycle prior to its release in the second period.   We are searching 
for a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in which all players’ strategies are sequentially 
optimal and consumers’ beliefs about the firm type are derived by the Bayes’ rule 
whenever possible.   We assume that product pre-announcements are ‘cheap talk’ and do 
not entail any costs to make.  As in any model of cheap talk, we always have a babbling 
equilibrium in which the cheap talk has no meaning and is rationally ignored by the 
receiver.   We are interested in whether we can have an informative equilibrium in which 
the firm, by making an announcement, can convey credible information on the quality of 
 8
its product to consumers.  We analyze how the reputation is formed in equilibrium and 
how the concern over reputation affects cheap talk.  
Figure 1 describes the timing of the game.   We denote the discount factor 
between the two product cycles by δ.9   For simplicity, we assume that there is no 
discounting between the two periods in each cycle.10   
 
The two periods in the 
first product cycle are 
repeated. 
Period 2 
 
A new product is 
introduced, and the 
true quality is 
revealed. 
Period 1 
 
After observing the quality 
of the new product, the firm 
announces its quality.  
 
Buyers wait or buy the 
current product which is 
competitively supplied. 
Second Product Cycle First Product Cycle 
 Figure 1: The Timing of Moves 
As usual, we proceed by using backward induction to derive the informative 
equilibrium.    
 
II.2.1. Second Product Cycle 
In the second product cycle that constitutes the last interaction with consumers, 
the firm does not have any reputational concerns and will simply seek to maximize its 
current profits.  Since all types benefit from inducing more consumers to wait, the firm’s 
announcement in the second product cycle (m2) has no credibility.  Thus, no consumer 
updates his beliefs µ2 based on the firm’s announcement m2.  Thus, the relevant history in 
the second product cycle is h  = (m2 1, q1), where m1 and q1  are the announced quality and 
                                                 
9 Even though the two product cycles entail different products, we assume that all parameters are the same 
across cycles.  We can easily modify the model to allow different parameter values with additional 
notation.  We can capture the differences in the importance of the two products by the discount factor δ. 
10 Once again, this assumption is made without any loss of generality, and discounting within the product 
cycle can be easily accommodated. 
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the delivered quality of the product, respectively, in the first cycle and 
∈{2h ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )}, , , , , , ,H H H L L H L L
2h 2 2h
.11  
( )22 hw 2h
2
2
( )
w
θ
θ
∂ Π
In each product cycle, consumers’ optimal strategy depends on their belief that 
the new product in the same cycle is of high-quality.  Thus, we associate consumers’ 
beliefs with the expected θ based on all information consumers have.  This implies that, 
at the beginning of period 2, there will be history-dependent beliefs (µ2) conditional on 
the announced and delivered qualities of the product in the first cycle. 
µ2( ) = E(θ| h ), where ∈ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }, , , , , , ,H H H L L H L L  
Given µ 2, consumers whose waiting cost (w) is lower than µ2sH+ (1− µ 2)sL will wait until 
period two.  Let wi* denote the cutoff point in product cycle i. Note that the threshold 
value w2* is history-dependent in the same way as the buyers’ beliefs.  
 w2* =  = µ2( )sH + [1− µ 2( h )]s2 L 
The number of consumers waiting in the second product cycle is G[ ].    ( 22 hw )
Given the consumers’ beliefs µ2, the expected profit of the firm whose type is θ is 
given by   
Π2 (θ) = G[µ2sH+ (1− µ 2)sL][θ +(1-θ) ]. Hπ Lπ
Since the profit is directly proportional to the number of consumers waiting (G[µ2sH+ 
(1− µ 2)sL]), and more consumers are willing to wait when the firm has a better reputation 
for “innovativeness” (that is, a higher µ2), all types of firms benefit from a better 
reputation.  However, the value of reputation is higher for firms with higher θ, that is, 
2
∂ ∂  >0.   Thus, the Spence-Mirrles single crossing property holds, and this property is 
an important factor in making the announcement in the first cycle informative.12  
 
II.2.2.  First Product Cycle 
We know that the announcement in the second (last) product cycle cannot contain 
any meaning since there is no further reputational concern for the firm.   In the first 
                                                 
11 If the firm does not make an announcement about its product, consumers believe that the product is of 
low quality. 
12 See Mas-Colell, et al. (1995) for the role of the single crossing property in the incentive literature. 
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product cycle, however, the firm has to be concerned with its reputation in view of the 
new product introduction in the second cycle.  Let m1(q1 ;θ) denote the message of type θ 
firm when it has the new product of quality q1 in the first cycle, where q1 = H or L. 
Since the firm with a higher θ has more incentive to maintain a better reputation, 
we are looking for an informative equilibrium with the following cut-off point property: 
For θ ≥ θ* m1(q1;θ) = q1 
For θ < θ* m1(q1;θ) = H 
In other words, if the product is of high quality, all types announce it truthfully; if the 
product is of low quality, then there is a cutoff point θ* such that types θ ≥ θ* announce it 
truthfully, and types θ <θ* make a false announcement.  
Consumers update their belief about the firm’s type according to the firm’s 
strategies.  Let us denote consumers’ beliefs in the first product cycle by µ1( ; θ*) 
when the firm is expected to adopt the cut-off rule of θ*, where  is the firm’s 
announcement about its quality and 
1m
1m
{ }1 ,m H L∈ .  By applying the Bayes rule, we can 
derive consumers’ beliefs in the first and second product cycles as follows: 
 
( )1 1
*
( ); *
( *) ( )
EH
F dF
θ
θµ θ
θ θ θ
=
+ ∫
,   ( ) ( )1 1; * 0L Lµ θ µ= =  
We can also derive consumers’ beliefs in the second product cycle, µ2( h ;θ*) = µ2 2( , 
;θ*), depending on the announced and delivered qualities in the first product cycle, 
when the firm was expected to adopt the cut-off rule of θ* in the first product cycle 
announcement.    
1m
1q
( )2 , ; *H Hµ θ =  =( )2 ,H Hµ
1 2
0
( )
( )
dF
E
θ θ
θ
∫ = 2( )
( )
E
E
θ
θ  ( ≥ E(θ)) 
µ2 (H, L; θ*) =
∫
∫
−
−
*
0
*
0
)()1(
)()1(
θ
θ
θθ
θθθ
dF
dF
,    µ2 (L, L; θ*) =
∫
∫
−
−
1
*
1
*
)()1(
)()1(
θ
θ
θθ
θθθ
dF
dF
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There is one off-equilibrium path in which the firm announces a low-quality product, but 
introduces a high-quality product. Since it is an off-equilibrium path, we can put any 
arbitrary belief on the case. We assume that µ2 (L, H)≤ µ2 (H, H) so that it is not optimal 
for the firm with a high-quality product to make a false announcement.  
)Let w m1 1( ; *θ denote the critical consumer type who is indifferent between 
buying and waiting in the first product cycle given that the firm announces { }1m H,L∈ . 
Similarly, let 2 2( ;w h *)θ  denote the second-period history-dependent cutoff point when 
the firm uses the cut-off point strategy θ* described above, where h2 denotes the feasible 
histories at the start of the second product cycle with ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }2 , , , ,H H H∈ , , ,L L L Lh H .  
Then, the consumers’ purchase behavior can be described by the following cut-off points 
in consumers’ waiting cost. 
 
w1(H; θ*) = (1 ; *H )µ θ sH + [1− ( )1 ; *Hµ θ ]sL  
     = 1
*
( )
( *) ( )
E
F dF
θ
θ
θ θ θ+ ∫
sH + [1− 1
*
( )
( *) ( )
E
F dF
θ
θ
θ θ θ+ ∫
]sL           (1) 
w1(L; θ*) = w1(L) = s( )1 Lµ H + [1− ( )1 Lµ ]sL = sL.    (2)  
w2(H, H; θ*) = w2(H, H) = ( )2 ,H Hµ sH + [1− ( )2 ,H Hµ ]sL              
    = 
2( )
( )
E
E
θ
θ sH + [1− 
2( )
( )
E
E
θ
θ ]sL                   (3) 
w2(L, L; θ*)  = µ2 (L, L; θ*) sH + [1− µ2 (L, L; θ*)]sL                          
          =  
∫
∫
−
−
1
*
1
*
)()1(
)()1(
θ
θ
θθ
θθθ
dF
dF
 sH + [1 − 
∫
∫
−
−
1
*
1
*
)()1(
)()1(
θ
θ
θθ
θθθ
dF
dF
]sL                (4) 
w2(H, L; θ*) = µ2 (H, L; θ*) sH + [1− µ2 (H, L; θ*)]sL      
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                 = 
∫
∫
−
−
*
0
*
0
)()1(
)()1(
θ
θ
θθ
θθθ
dF
dF
sH + [1- 
∫
∫
−
−
*
0
*
0
)()1(
)()1(
θ
θ
θθ
θθθ
dF
dF
]sL                        (5) 
  
If a consumer’s waiting cost is higher than the relevant cutoff point, consumers 
buy the currently available product in the first period. Otherwise, the consumer waits 
until the new product is available.  Notice that w1(L; θ*) and w2(H, H; θ*) do not depend 
on θ* and w2(L, L; θ*) >w2(H, L; θ*). 
So far, we have constructed consumers’ optimal choices given the firm’s strategy 
that can be represented by the cut-off point θ*.   We now check whether the firm has any 
incentive to deviate from the strategy profile under the consumers’ optimal choices.  To 
this purpose, let  Π( ; (θ, q); θ*) denote the firm’s overall expected profit if the firm 
announces its quality as  when its type is θ, its actual quality in the first product cycle 
is q, and consumers believe that the firm is adopting the cutoff rule θ*.   Then, we have  
1m
1m
 
Π(H; (θ, H); θ*) = G[w1(H; θ*)]  + δG[wHπ 2(H, H)][θ  +(1-θ) ], (6) Hπ Lπ
Π(H; (θ, L); θ*) = G[w1(H; θ*)]  + δG[wLπ 2(H, L; θ*)][θ  +(1-θ) ], (7) Hπ Lπ
       Π(L; (θ, L); θ*) = G[w1(L)] + δG[wLπ 2(L, L; θ*)][θ  +(1-θ) ].  (8) Hπ Lπ
 
We can easily find that it is optimal for the firm with a high-quality product to tell it 
truthfully.  The firm with a low-quality product has an incentive to tell the truth (i.e., 
announce the low quality) if and only if  
 
∆(θ, θ∗) = Π(L; (θ, L); θ*) − Π(H; (θ, L); θ*)  
= {G[w1(L)] − G[w1(H; θ*)]} +  Lπ
δ{G[w2(L, L; θ*)] − G[w2(H, L; θ*)] }[θ  +(1-θ) ] ≥ 0  (9)  Hπ Lπ
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The first term in the expression above represents potential short-term losses when the 
firm refrains from cheating in the first cycle, whereas the second term represents the 
long-term gains from being truthful; as long as the long-term gains outweigh the short-
term losses, the firm will have an incentive to tell the truth when it has a low-quality 
product. We can define an implicit function ψ(θ*) that satisfies ∆(ψ(θ*), θ∗) = 0. Notice 
that ∆(θ, θ∗) is increasing in θ since ∂∆(θ, θ∗)/∂θ = δ{G[w2(L, L; θ*)] − G[w2(H, L; 
θ*)] }(  - )>0; the incentive to tell the truth increases with the type parameter θ.   
This implies that the cutoff point that satisfies ψ(θ*) = θ* characterizes an informative 
equilibrium.  
Hπ Lπ
For the equilibrium to be informative, the fixed point θ* needs to be in the 
interval of [0, 1), with the lower fixed point θ* corresponding to a more informative 
equilibrium in the first product cycle.  A sufficient condition for the fixed point θ* to be 
less than 1 is ψ(θ*=1) < 1, or, alternatively, ∆(θ = 1, θ∗=1) > 0, which implies that if 
consumers believe that only the highest type (θ =1) tells the truth when it has a low-
quality product, then there are other types who are willing to tell the truth to disguise 
themselves as the highest type firm in the first product cycle.    
 
Lemma 2. If δ> 1
2
( ) ( )
( ) ( ( ))
L
HH
G w G s
G s G w L
π
π
−
−
L , then ψ(θ*=1) < 1.    
Proof.  We can write the condition as: 
∆(θ = 1, θ∗=1) = Π(L; (1, L); 1) − Π(H; (1, L); 1)  
= {G[w1(L)] − G[w1(H; 1)]} + δ{G[wLπ 2(L, L; 1)] − G[w2(H, L; 1)] } Hπ >0 
We notice that w1(L) = sL and w2(L, L; 1) = sH.  Furthermore, by using equations (1)-(5) 
and the definitions of 1w  and 2w ( L), we can derive the following: 
w1(H; 1) = 1w  = E(θ) sH+ (1-E(θ))sL      (10) 
w2(H, L; 1) = 2w (L) = 
2( ) ( )
1 ( )
E E
E
θ θ
θ
−
−  sH + [1 − 
2( ) ( )
1 ( )
E E
E
θ θ
θ
−
− ]sL    (11) 
Equations (10) and (11) essentially say that if only the highest type firm (θ =1 whose 
mass is zero with a continuous distribution) is expected to make a truthful announcement 
with everyone else always making an announcement of H, consumers ignore the message 
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of H and behave as if there were no announcement. Thus, the condition 
∆(θ = 1, θ∗=1) > 0 is satisfied if and only if δ > 1
2
( ) ( )
( ) ( ( ))
L L
HH
G w G s
G s G w L
π
π
−
− .  Q.E.D. 
 
The following lemma shows that if consumers believe that all firms tell the truth, 
then the lowest type firm has an incentive to lie when it has a low quality product in the 
first product cycle. 
 
Lemma 3.. ψ(θ*= 0) > 0.  
Proof.  ∆(θ = 0, θ∗=0) = Π(L; (0, L); 0) − Π(H; (0, L); 0)  
= {G[w1(L)] − G[w1(H; 0)]} + δ{G[wLπ 2(L, L; 0)] − G[w2(H, L; 0)] } . Lπ
According to equations (1)-(5), w1(L) = sL, w1(H; 0) = sH, w2(L, L; 0) = 2w (L) = [(E(θ)-
E(θ2))/(1-E(θ))]sH + {1 − [(E(θ)-E(θ2))/(1-E(θ)]}sL, w2(H, L; 0) = sL.  Since w2(L, L; 0) 
= 2w (L) < sH and δ <1, ∆(θ = 0, θ∗=0) < 0, which implies that ψ(θ*= 0) > 0.    Q.E.D. 
 
Remark  
Lemma 3 relies on the assumption that the profits of the firm ( Hπ  and ) are the same 
across product cycles.  If the second product cycle market is relatively more important or 
if there are more product cycles, as in an infinite horizon game, then reputation becomes 
more important and it is possible that ψ(θ*= 0) < 0; there exists an equilibrium in which 
all firms tell the truth.   For instance, let δ represent the relative market size of the second 
product market compared to the first one.  Then, ψ(θ*= 0) < 0 if δ > 
Lπ
δ =
2
( ) ( )
( ( )) ( )
H L
L
G s G s
G w L G s
−
−  
(>1).  
 
The discussion up to this point can be summarized in the following Proposition. 
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Proposition 1. If δ> 1
2
( ) ( )
( ) ( ( ))
L
HH
G w G s
G s G w L
π
π
−
−
L , where 1w  = E(θ) sH+ (1-E(θ))sL and 2w (L) = 
2( ) ( )
1 ( )
E E
E
θ θ
θ
−
−  sH + [1 − 
2( ) ( )
1 ( )
E E
E
θ θ
θ
−
− ]sL, there exists an informative equilibrium with a 
cutoff point θ* ∈[0, 1) that has the following properties: 
 
(a) In the first cycle, the firm whose type is higher than a cut-off point θ* makes a 
truthful announcement.  That is, it makes a high-quality product announcement 
only if it has a high-quality product. 
(b) In the first cycle, the firm whose type is lower than the cut-off point always 
announces that its product is of high quality.  This implies that a low type firm 
can practice vaporware in which it makes a promise that it cannot deliver. 
(c) Product announcements in the second product cycle do not convey any meaning. 
 
 We have developed a reputational model of a cheap talk game with a finite 
number of product cycles.   If we considered an infinite horizon of product cycles, we 
would have a similar result, with the high types always telling the truth and the low types 
lying when they have a low-quality product.   The mechanism through which the high 
types tell the truth would be similar to the one in Choi’s (1998) model of brand extension. 
In Choi (1998), as long as all previous products with the same brand name were of high 
quality, consumers believe that a new product under that brand name will be of high 
quality as well.   Once the brand name is extended to a low-quality product, consumers 
ignore any signaling value of brand extension. 13   
 
III. Welfare Analysis 
In the previous section, we conducted a positive analysis identifying conditions 
under which product pre-announcements can convey (partial) information to potential 
consumers.  In this section, we conduct a normative analysis to investigate implications 
of product pre-announcements for social welfare and antitrust policy.  In particular, we 
                                                 
13 One major difference between Choi’s brand extension model and our model is that the model in Choi 
(1998) is of moral hazard and there is no uncertainty about the firm type.  In contrast, in our model, there is 
also an adverse selection problem about the firm type with the separation of types taking place over time. 
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are concerned with how consumers’ utilities and the firm’s profits change with the 
possibility of product pre-announcements.14  
We first claim that allowing pre-announcements helps consumers make better 
decisions, and its ex ante effect on expected consumer welfare is positive. 
 
Proposition 2. Allowing pre-announcement improves expected consumer welfare. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
 
In the Appendix, we prove that consumers are always better off with product pre-
announcements, even if the firm is allowed to make misleading claims about its future 
product.  Consumers can rationally discount the firm’s claims, and the firm’s 
announcement can be at least partially revealing and, thus, can only help consumers make 
a better decision.   
More specifically, there are two effects that help consumers.   In the first product 
cycle, the high-type firms (θ ≥ θ*) reveal their quality truthfully when they have a low-
quality product and, thus, enhance their reputation.15   In contrast, such valuable 
information will not be available in the absence of product pre-announcements.   If the 
firm announces a high-quality product, consumers will update their beliefs accordingly, 
taking into account the fact that low-type firms with a low-quality product will lie. Thus, 
ex ante, rational consumers make better decisions with product pre-announcements in an 
informative equilibrium.  
In the second product cycle, there is an additional informational benefit from 
better sorting.   To be more precise, we can consider three possible histories in the second 
product cycle.  If the firm introduced a high-quality product in the first cycle, the 
consumer welfare in the second product cycle would be the same across the two regimes 
since consumers have the same beliefs about the firm in both cases and adopt the same 
cutoff rule ( 2w  ( H)) = w2(H, H)  = 
2( )
( )
E
E
θ
θ sH + [1− 
2( )
( )
E
E
θ
θ ]sL ).  However, if the firm 
                                                 
14 The existing products at the time of product pre-announcements are assumed to be supplied 
competitively and the producers of those products earn zero profits.  As a result, their profits do not figure 
in the overall welfare analysis. 
15 Morris (2001) calls this the discipline effect. 
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introduced a low-quality product in the first cycle, consumers can sort the firm into one 
of the two sets of firm types (high types and low types with the boundary at θ*) 
depending on whether or not they have lied.  As a result, consumers can make ex ante 
better decisions in the second cycle with product pre-announcements.   With these two 
informational effects taken together, we can conclude that consumers are better off in our 
model. 
Our welfare result on consumers thus formalizes the argument in Fisher, et al. 
(1983) and Levy (1997).  They reason that “[b]roken promises and unattractive products 
can be expected to lead quickly to a loss of credibility and sales” (Fisher, et al., 1983).  
As a result, firms will refrain from making false announcements due to concerns about 
reputation and “there is no reason to inhibit the time when a firm announces or brings 
products to the market place.”  In a sense, however, our result is stronger than their claim. 
In our model, deliberate misrepresentations take place in equilibrium due to the existence 
of different firm types.  Nonetheless, we were able to show that consumers are better off 
with product pre-announcements as long as consumers are aware of such incentives for 
misrepresentation on the part of the firm.16   
The effect of product pre-announcements on the firm’s profits is less clear, and 
we cannot rule out that the firm’s ex ante profits may decrease with the possibility of 
product pre-announcements.   We will provide two examples that illustrate the 
ambiguous effects on the firm’s profits; in the first case, allowing pre-announcements 
increases the firm’s expected profit, but in the second case, it reduces the firm’s expected 
profit.  Consider an informative equilibrium with θ*=0, that is, all firm types tell 
truthfully when they have a low-quality product (this would be the case if the reputational 
concern is sufficiently important).   Since all types make a truthful announcement, the 
expected profit in the second cycle is the same in both regimes.17  The ex ante expected 
profit in the first cycle under the informative equilibrium with θ*=0 is  
                                                 
16 One can ask the question of why antitrust policy cannot focus only on false claims made by the firm—
that is, only truthful product pre-announcements are allowed.   In reality, however, it would be difficult to 
implement such a policy because of the difficulty and ambiguity associated with ascertaining whether the 
firm actually delivered the promised quality, especially when the new features promised are something 
non-existent at the time of announcement—a fact that makes direct contracting between the firm and 
consumers infeasible in the first place.    
17 If θ*=0, then w2 (L, L; 1) = 2w ( L) and w2(H, H) = 2w ( H)).    
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∫ −+1
0
))()(1()( LLHH sGsG πθπθ dF(θ)  
The ex ante expected profit in the first cycle without product pre-announcements is  
1
1
0
( ) (1 )( ( ) )1H LG w G wθ π θ+ −∫ π  dF(θ), where 1w = E(θ)sH+(1-E(θ))sL. 
 
Example 1:  If G(.) is a uniform distribution, it can be easily verified that the profit under 
informative equilibrium is higher than the profit without product pre-announcements. 
 
Example 2: If G( 1w ) is very close to G(sH), the profit under informative equilibrium is 
lower than the profit without product pre-announcements. 
 
Thus, we can conclude that the welfare effect of product pre-announcements on the 
firm’s profits is ambiguous.  
 
IV.  Concluding Remarks 
It is common practice, especially in the computer industry, for firms to announce 
new products well in advance of actual market availability.   This practice, often called 
“vaporware,” has been a topic of intensive discussion both in the business press and the 
anti-trust arena.   We developed a simple model of such a practice.  In particular, we 
derived conditions under which such an announcement can impart valuable information 
to consumers, even if it is cheap talk that does not entail any direct cost of signaling, and 
investigated its welfare implications.   
We conclude by discussing the robustness and potential extensions of the model.  
Our welfare result for consumers depends crucially on the assumption that there are no 
externalities associated with consumers’ purchase decisions.  However, product pre-
announcements have been prominent in industries characterized by network effects, such 
as the computer industry.   In such a case, we cannot rule out the possibility that product 
pre-announcements may influence which product prevails in the marketplace and lead to 
socially inefficient technology adoption. This may be true even if those who make 
purchase/wait decisions are better-informed as a result of product pre-announcements. 
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The inefficiency arises from the incompatibility between the old and new products that 
results in “stranding” of consumers who already purchased the old product.  Farrell and 
Saloner (1986) demonstrate such a possibility in a dynamic model of technology 
adoption.18  This possibility certainly makes the implementation of anti-trust policy on 
product pre-announcements difficult and cautions against blanket approval of product 
pre-announcements.  It would be worthwhile to incorporate network effects in our model 
of product pre-announcements and investigate its welfare implications.   
Finally, product pre-announcements are important in fast-evolving and innovative 
industries where technical progress is rapid and early lock-ins might preclude the 
emergence of superior technologies.   We analyzed the implications of product pre-
announcements with the speed of technical progress exogenously given.  However, the 
possibility of product pre-announcements and the government policy concerning them 
may feed back into the firms’ incentives to innovate and their R&D strategies.   
Considering the central role innovation plays in these industries, investigating the 
interplay between product pre-announcements and endogenous R&D incentives seems to 
be an important research agenda. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Their paper, however, considers only truthful pre-announcements and does not analyze the possibility of 
false announcements and consumers’ inference problem about their informational content. 
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Appendix 
1. A Specific Model 
In the main text, we set up a model without being specific about the nature of 
competition and the demand structure of consumers.  Our model was very general and 
only assumed that consumers who delay their purchase decision derive a higher expected 
surplus from the high-quality product than from the low-quality product, that is, sH > 
sL>0.  In addition, we assumed that the firm earns higher expected profits from the high-
quality product than from the low-quality product, with  > > 0.  In this appendix, 
we provide a specific model that satisfies the assumptions in Section II, which can be 
considered as the micro-foundation of the model.    
Hπ Lπ
The new product developed by the firm is superior to the existing product, 
regardless of its quality realization.  For each quality realization, we assume that the 
amount of additional value the new product provides vis-à-vis the existing product is 
random and differs across consumers.  If the new product is of high quality, its additional 
value is distributed uniformly between [0, Ha ], while it is distributed uniformly between 
[0, La ] if the product of low quality, where Ha > La .  This value is revealed to 
consumers only in the second period and is unknown to them in the first period.19  As a 
result, with respect to the net valuation of new product, consumers are ex ante 
homogeneous in period one but are ex post heterogeneous in period two.20  The measure 
of consumers is one. 
Without any loss of generality, we assume that the production costs for both old 
and new products are zero. Thus, the existing product is competitively supplied at the 
price of zero.  When the firm sets its price at pi, consumers whose additional values from 
                                                 
19 For instance, when new features are promised for new software, it would be difficult to know in advance 
how much additional value such features would provide. 
20 The assumption also implies that the firm sets its price for the new product knowing only the distribution 
of the values, not the actual value for each individual. This assumption, by preventing the possibility that 
the firm extracts all consumer surplus, gives consumers incentive to wait for the new product. 
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the new product are higher than pi will buy the new product. That is, given pi, the demand 
is 
i
ii
a
pa −  when the quality of the product is i, where i = H, L.  This implies that the 
(inverse) demand curve for the new product is given by ip = (1 )ia q− .   A 
straightforward calculation reveals that in equilibrium we have 
2
2
2
2
1 ,  where ,
2 2
i
i
i
i
i
i
ap
a
as i
π
=
 =   
 = =   L H
 
 
This simple model satisfies all the assumptions in the main text. Consumers make 
their purchase/wait decision based on the expected surplus from the new product, with 
the high-quality product providing more additional expected value than the low-quality 
one.   
 
2. Proof of Proposition 2 
We prove that consumer welfare always increases with product pre-
announcement.  
Let WNA  denote the expected consumer welfare without announcement.  We 
decompose WNA  into expected consumer welfare in the first and second product cycles, 
W1NA  and W2NA.  Without product pre-announcements, consumers delay their purchase 
in the first product cycle if their waiting costs are less than 1w = E(θ)sH + [1-E(θ)]sL.  
Consumers’ purchase decision in the second product cycle depends on the realization of 
new product quality in the first product cycle.  When the product quality in the first cycle 
quality is q, consumers delay their purchase if their waiting costs are less than 2w ( q) = 
E(θ| q) sH+ [1-E(θ| q)]sL, where q = H, L and 2w  (H) > 1w > 2w  ( L).   Thus, we have 
 
WNA = W1NA +W2NA,  
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where  W1NA = 
1
0
∫ 1
0
w
∫ [θsH + (1-θ)sL+w] dG(w) dF(θ)+
1
1
w
∫ 2w dG(w) and  
W2NA= θ(
1
0
∫ 2
( )
0
w H
∫ [θsH + (1-θ)sL+w] dG(w) +
2
1
( )w H
∫ 2w dG(w)) d F(θ)  
+ (1-θ)(
1
0
∫ 2
( )
0
w L
∫ [θsH + (1-θ)sL+w] dG(w) +
2
1
( )w L
∫ 2w dG(w)) d F(θ) 
 
Similarly, let WA denote the expected consumer welfare when the firm is allowed to 
make an announcement.   When the equilibrium is characterized by a cutoff point θ*, 
consumers delay their purchase in the first product cycle when their waiting costs are less 
than w1(H;θ*) and w1(L) when the firm announces high and low quality products, 
respectively (see equations (1) and (2) in the main text).  The second cycle consumers’ 
decision is characterized by w2(H, H), w2(L, L; θ*), and w2(H, L; θ*), depending on the 
announced and delivered quality in the first product cycle (see equations (3)-(5)).   
Then, we have 
 
WA = W1A +W2A, 
where W1A = [ [θs
*
0
θ∫ 1
( ; *)
0
w H θ
∫ H + (1-θ)sL+w] dG(w) +
1
1
( ; *)w H θ
∫ 2w dG(w)] dF(θ) 
+ θ(  (s
*
1
θ
∫ 1
( ; *)
0
w H θ
∫ H+w) dG(w) +
1
1
( ; *)w H θ
∫ 2w dG(w)) dF(θ)  
+ (1-θ)( (s
*
1
θ
∫ 1
( )
0
w L
∫ L+w) dG(w) +
1
1
( )w L
∫ 2w dG(w)) dF(θ) and  
W2A = θ( [θs
1
0
∫ 2
( , )
0
w H H
∫ H + (1-θ)sL+w] dG(w) +
2
1
( , )w H H
∫ 2w dG(w)) d F(θ)  
         +  (1-θ)( [θs
*
0
θ∫ 2
( , ; *)
0
w H L θ
∫ H + (1-θ)sL+w] dG(w) +
2
1
( , ; *)w H L θ
∫ 2w dG(w)) d F(θ) 
           +  (1-θ)( [θs
*
1
θ
∫ 2
( , ; *)
0
w L L θ
∫ H + (1-θ)sL+w] dG(w) +
2
1
( , ; *)w L L θ
∫ 2w dG(w))d F(θ) 
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 Lemma A1.  W1A − W1NA > 0 
Proof.  We first manipulate the expression for W1NA in the following way: 
 
W1NA = 
1
0
∫ 1
0
w
∫  (θsH + (1-θ)s + w) dG(w) dF(θ)+
1
1
w
∫ 2w dG(w) 
=
*
0
θ∫ 1
0
w
∫  (θsH + (1-θ)sL + w) dG(w) dF(θ) 
    +
*
1
θ
∫ 1
0
w
∫ θ(sＨ＋ｗ) dG(w) dF(θ)＋
*
1
θ
∫ 1
0
w
∫  (1-θ) (sＬ＋ｗ) dG(w) dF(θ) 
   ＋
*
0
θ∫
1
1
w
∫ 2w dG(w)＋
*
1
θ
∫
1
1
w
∫ θ2w＋(1-θ)2w dG(w) 
= [
*
0
θ∫ 1
0
w
∫  (θsH + (1-θ)s + w) dG(w) +
1
1
w
∫ 2w dG(w)] dF(θ) 
   + θ(
*
1
θ
∫ 1
0
w
∫  (sＨ＋w) dG(w) +
1
1
w
∫ 2w dG(w) )dF(θ) 
 
   + (1-θ)(
*
1
θ
∫ 1
0
w
∫  (sL＋ｗ) dG(w) +
1
1
w
∫ 2w dG(w) )dF(θ) 
The difference in consumer welfare in the first product cycle can be written as 
 
W1A - W1NA=
*
0
θ∫ 1
1
( ; *)w H
w
θ
∫ (θsH + (1-θ)sL-w)dG(w)dF(θ) +
*
1
θ
∫ 1
1
( ; *)w H
w
θ
∫ θ(sH -w)dG(w)dF(θ)  
+ (1-θ)(w-s
*
1
θ
∫
1 ( )
w
w L
′
∫ L) dG(w) dF(θ) 
        =
1
1
( ; *)w H
w
θ
∫
*
0
θ∫ (θsH + (1-θ)sL-w)dF(θ)dG(w) + 1
( )w H
w′
∫
*
1
θ
∫ θ(sH –w)dF(θ)dG(w) 
    + 
1
1 ( )
w
w L
∫ ∫  (1-θ)(w-s
*
1
θ
L)dF(θ)dG(w) 
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= 
1
1
( ; *)w H
w
θ
∫ [ {θs
*
0
θ∫ H + (1-θ)sL-w} dF(θ)+
*
1
θ
∫ θ{sH -w} dF(θ)]dG(w)  
+ 
1
1 ( )
w
w L
∫
*
1
θ
∫  (1-θ){w-sL} }dF(θ)dG(w) 
               =
1
1
( ; *)w H
w
θ
∫ [ sH ( θ dF(θ)) + s1
0
∫ L(
*
0
θ∫ (1-θ)dF(θ))−w(
*
0
θ∫ dF(θ)+ θdF(θ))]dG(w)  
*
1
θ
∫
+ 
1
1 ( )
w
w L
∫
*
1
θ
∫  (1-θ)(w-sL)dF(θ)dG(w) 
 
Let us check the sign of the above equation.  First, if we divide the first integral term in 
the last line 
1
1
( ; *)w H
w
θ
∫ [ sH ( θ dF(θ)) + s1
0
∫ L(
*
0
θ∫ (1-θ)dF(θ))-
w( dF(θ)+ θdF(θ))]dG(w) by , we have 
*
0
θ∫
*
1
θ
∫ 1θ* θ∫F(θ*)+ dF(θ) 1
1
( ; *)w H
w
θ
∫ [sH + s( )1 Hµ L(1-
)-w]dG(w) , which is positive for w between (1 H )µ 1w and w1(H;θ*).  Second, w-sL is 
positive for w between 1w  and w1(L).  Thus, the second term (
1
1 ( )
w
w L
∫
*
1
θ
∫  (1-θ){w-
sL} }dF(θ)dG(w)) is also positive and W1A – W1NA >0 
 
Lemma A2.  W2A − W2NA > 0 
Proof. The difference in consumer welfare in the second product cycle is given by 
 
W2A - W2NA = 
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To check the sign of the first integral term, notice that  
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If we divide the expression above by 
*
0
θ∫ (1-θ)dF(θ)), we get w − µ2 (H, L) sH-(1-µ2 (H, 
L)) sL.  For w between 2w  (L) and w2(H, L; θ*), w − µ2 (H, L) sH-(1-µ2 (H, L)) sL>0. 
Thus, 
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We now check the sign of the second integral term.  If we divide the term 
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∫ (1−θ) dF(θ), we get µ2 (L, L ; θ*) sH + (1−µ2 
(L, L ; θ*)) sL –w. Since µ2 (L, L; θ*) sH + [1−µ2 (L, L;θ*)] sL –w is positive for w between 
2w  (L) and w2(L,L; θ*), 
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∫ (1−θ){θsH + (1-θ )sL − w} dF(θ)]dG(w)} is 
positive. Thus, W2A − W2NA >0.   
Combining Lemmas A1 and A2, we can conclude that WA − WNA >0.  Q.E.D.  
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